Saturday, January 21, 2006

What's wrong with this message?

"To retreat before victory has been won would be a reckless act -- and the president and our party will not allow it." Karl Rove

Karl Rove is out and about again rallying the (Republican) troops for this year's election. As the above quote indicates, the plan is to run, again, on staying the course and pursuing "victory" in Iraq.

But the problem with that strategy is this; we have already had our "victory" in Iraq.

That victory, as Karl knows, was celebrated when the President stepped onto that aircraft carrier in a borrowed Top Gun suit -- and all it won for us was a lousy occupation.

Everything that has followed the fall of Baghdad and the capture of Saddam has been about dealing with the inevitable reality of military victory.

The administration, in verbally projecting "victory" somewhere into a misty and idyllic future, hopes to divert our eyes from this material truth; they accomplished everything they wanted in Iraq without achieving any of the benefit they expected.

The military action was a success, but the foreign policy strategy is a failure. And nothing we do militarily in the future can change that fait accompli.

Conquering Iraq militarily has not "changed the paradigm" in the Mideast (except, perhaps, for the worse), it has not increased security at home or lessened terrorism abroad (Osama Bin Laden still lives to threaten us).

What it has done is emboldened more dangerous enemies (Iran and North Korea), strained relationships with our allies, highlighted our weaknesses before the world, over-stretched our military and saddled us with the costly, in both American lives and treasure, long term responsibility for a destroyed and divided state.

It is well past time for the press, the public and the oppostion party to face up to that reality and finally call a spade a spade. What is going on in Iraq isn't a "war" -- it is an occupation. And at issue isn't whether we are willing to "do what it takes to win," but rather whether we are ready to own up to what we've won -- and do what we can to correct and recover from a disasterously failed policy.

Friday, January 20, 2006

The South-obsessed D.C. establishment strikes again -- choosing Virginia's newly elected Democratic governor (and great hope of establishment moderates who still think there's a "New South" in which the party, with enough pandering, can prevail), Tim Kaine, to give the Democratic response to the President's State of the Union speech.

Kaine is a bright, well-spoken technocrat, who represents some of the best aspects of the liberal meritocracy. But he is not a man to represent the kind of pugnacious, populist spirit that's long been missing from the party -- and that the times demand.

He represents the party's strenuous efforts to hold on to bits and pieces of an old, dying coalition -- rather than evidence of new vitality and growth. Or, evidence that the party's leaders understand that difficult times demand difficult and dramatic change within the party itself.

If what they wanted was to introduce a new Democratic star to the nation, they would have been better served by tapping the first Democrat to win the governorship in Montana in over decade and a half -- Gov. Brian Schweitzer. A smart man with a genuine populist touch, from a part of the country that the Democrats continue to ignore at their peril.

Thursday, January 19, 2006

Speech Maker in Chief


As the administration gears up for the State of the Union, I have some thoughts on President Bush as a speech maker -- that go beyond the usual complaints about his difficulties with the language or the usual compliments for his "regular guy" style.

Commentators often note how comfortable Bush is with the language of (Evangelical) "faith." But less noted, and in light of his administration's failures and his falling popularity more important, is Bush's extreme discomfort with both moral argument and the traditional language of small "d" democracy.

Time and again, Bush has explicitly rejected moral argument as little more than an attempt to make him justify, second guess or explain himself. Even more interesting, to me at least -- and unique among Presidents in my lifetime -- it never seems to occur to him to appeal to us, in the democratic tradition, as fellow citizens who he hopes to inspire to unite with him (in a great cause or enterprise). The reason for this, I believe, is because frankly he doesn't see us that way.

However "regular guy" he strives to be, at heart Bush is an authoritarian and autocrat.

His speeches, whatever the subject, tend to be not about us (we, the people), but, primarily about himself (he, the magnificent) -- his resolve, his faith, his beliefs, his responsibilities, his suffering ("It's hard work").

This, for instance, is how he opened the first speech (in a series) he gave to win back our support on the war in Iraq, "My greatest responsibility as president is to protect the American people."

It's a sentence (often repeated) that immediately asserts his rank, his centrality and importance as our leader, and his wish to reassure and comfort those of us who follow. But it is not one that can, or is meant to, inspire or activate. Instead, it reflects an attitude that sees "the people" as dependent, childlike, waiting to be reassured and led by the leader's higher resolve and wisdom. Not as, in the democratic tradition, a powerful, active, moral force.

There are many Americans -- and perhaps more today than in the past -- for whom the language of simple faith, unyielding authority and comforting assurance are enough (and the complexity of moral judgement and ethical choice, perhaps, too much). If that weren't true Bush wouldn't have won the last election.

But, as new information and events continue to undermine Bush's credibility, and therefore his authority, and more Americans feel less protected -- from the realities on the ground in Iraq, from the suffering of military families, from the incompetence on display after Katrina, from the shock of oil prices and health care costs, from doubts about the economy, etc. -- it may no longer be enough.

With his authority tarnished, and their faith (in him) waning, it is probably now too late for Bush to make the moral arguments, and the democratic appeals to shared sacrifice, he failed to make earlier.

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Joshua Green in the current Atlantic (January/February 2006) invites us to be surprised by the bumper crop of returning Iraq/Afghanistan veterans who are currently planning a run for political office. But in comparing the greater, more immediate political participation of today's returning Iraq vets (and yesterday's WWII vets) to the veterans of Vietnam he overlooks some basic facts. The average age of combat soldiers in the Vietnam War was only 19. The average age of combat soldiers in WWII was 26. The average age of today’s active-duty soldier is 28. The average age of today’s reservist? 32.

The youthful Vietnam veteran often had years of work ahead of him to gain or complete an education and establish a career before he could seriously consider running for office -- or be considered seriously as a political candidate. Plus, he had to do so in competition with a great many service-avoiding contemporaries who were already steps ahead of him (and who dominate our politics today).

This age difference alone made it easily predictable that returning Iraq and Afghanistan veterans would, like the veterans of WWII, enter the political arena sooner and, perhaps (only time will tell), to more immediate and greater effect than the veterans of Vietnam.

Green also asks us to be surprised that the overwhelming majority of these vets intend to run as Democrats -- suggesting that this is made possible because the party has become less "anti-GI" than during the Vietnam era. But the suggestion that that era's Democratic Party was "anti-GI," is totally unsupported. Veterans, in fact, dominated the party at the time and for many years after. The party’s most out-spoken liberal critics of the war were veterans (and, of course, not all of that eras outspoken critics of the war were Democrats). Those Vietnam veterans who did eventually enter politics were as likely, if not more likely, to do so as Democrats.

Was there anti-soldier feeling among some of the most extreme, youthful anti-war contemporaries of that war's veterans? Sure. But those movement extremists weren't fans of the Democratic Party, either. More significant but mostly overlooked by all but the veterans who experienced it; anti-soldier feeling wasn't limited to opponents of that war.

Many war supporters disdained the young men who fought it and blamed them, personally, for its humiliating loss. The "we won our war" sneers of older vets that greeted returning vets like my brother at the VFW were much more deeply wounding than any criticism from the political fringe. In addition to the relative youth of the Vietnam era vet, this attitude of war supporters -- who saw these young soldiers as feckless losers, rather than as heroes -- was a significant reason why service in Vietnam was and remains less of a political asset than service in other wars.

That lack of respect for the soldiers of Vietnam sadly still persists -- and is not limited or defined by political ideology. In fact, one of the most common arguments against a draft that conservatives make today is the, in their estimation, "poor quality" of the soldiers who fought in Vietnam. And, as recent political campaigns demonstrate, it is the Republican Party that has perfected assaults on and found great advantage in exploiting lingering disappointment and doubts about the personal character and ability of that war’s soldiers. (In campaigns against Republican veteran John McCain as well as Democrats.)

Will Republicans, whose current leaders almost to a man avoided service in Vietnam, be able to successfully use similar character attacks to good advantage against the Iraq War’s politically active vets?

The answer to that may lie, in some part, in how wedded those in the media remain to the kind of unexamined political clichés on display in Mr. Green’s report.